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Abstract
Our aim is to use the logic of public announcements and more
generally dynamic epistemic logics as a logic of speech acts.
To that end we start from a simple multimodal logic of be-
liefs and goals (without common belief), and add public an-
nouncements. We suppose that announcements do not mod-
ify goals. We then consider several variants of speech acts of
assertive and directive force and provide a modeling in terms
of speech acts.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we consider the domain of communication
between agents, in particular we describe the dynamics of
mental states due to communication by means of speech
acts. Starting from the representation of speech acts by
(Grice 1989), we consider the mental states which define
the success preconditions of a speech act: intentions and be-
lief. Thus Alice can say to Ben I like cookies. The mental
state corresponding to this action, if Alice is honest, is that
Alice wants that Ben believes that she likes cookies. This
is the well-known assertive speech act. On this way, Grice
defines other kinds of speech acts we consider in this paper:
assert, inform , confirm , request, yes-no question. We do
not only consider the mental states of the speaker, but also
we represent the mental states of the hearer. In particular,
we represent how the speech act influences beliefs and in-
tentions of a locutor.
In agreement with Grice’s theory, we suppose that when
an agent speaks, he informs about his mental states. In the
previous example, when Ben hears Alice’s utterance I like
cookies, whether he thinks Alice is honest or not, he starts to
believe that Alice wants him to beliefs that she likes cookies.
Thus, in case of a successfull communication, the hearer will
understand the mental states of the speaker.
The success preconditions of speech acts are formalized
in this work by means of a modal logic of beliefs and goals.
Similar formalisms have been used in (Herzig and Longin
2002; david Sadek 2000). The logic is extended with modal
operators for announcements of Dynamic Epistemic Logic
(DEL) (van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek, and Kooi 2007) in
order to model the dynamics speech acts. Our formalism
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enables to represent how a speech act of the speaker modi-
fies the beliefs of the hearer and so to capture the dynamic
dimension of a dialogue between agents.
The paper is organized as follows: we first present the
static modal logic of beliefs and goals. Then we provide a
definition of model update by an announcement. Finally, we
formally characterize the success preconditions of several
kinds of speech acts and we develop an analysis of speech
act dynamics.
2. A logic of beliefs and goals
Let PRP = {p, q, . . .} be a countable set of propositional
letters, and let AGT = {i, j, . . .} be a countable set of
agents. The set of formulas of our logic of beliefs and goals
is defined by the following BNF:
φ ::= p | > | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Bel iφ | Goal iφ
where p ranges over PRP and i ranges over AGT . Bel iφ
reads “agent i believes that φ” and Goal iφ reads “agent i
wants that φ”. The others boolean operators⊥,∨,→ and↔
are defined in the standard way.
Models for that language are of the form M =
〈W,B,G, V 〉 where
• W is a nonempty set of possible worlds;
• B : AGT −→ 2W×W associates a belief accessibility
relation to every agent;
• G : AGT −→ 2W×W associates a goal accessibility re-
lation to every agent;
• V : W −→ 2PRP associates to every possible world a
valuation.
We use Bi(w) to denote the set {w ′ | 〈w ,w ′〉 ∈ Bi}, Gi(w)
to denote the set {w ′ | 〈w ,w ′〉 ∈ Gi}. Bi(w) is the set of
worlds that are compatible with agent i’s beliefs at world w
and Gi(w) is the set of worlds that are compatible with agent
i’s goals at world w .
The truth conditions are as usual:
• M,u |= Bel iφ iff M,v |= φ for every v such that uBiv;
• M,u |= Goal iφ iff M,v |= φ for every v such that uGiv;
The logic of that class of models is fairly standard. It can
be axiomatized by the principles of K45 for the belief op-
erator Bel i, the principles of KD for the goal modal Goal i,
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plus the following axiom schemas of positive and negative
introspection for goals:
(1) Goal iφ→ Bel iGoal iφ
(2) ¬Goal iφ→ Bel i¬Goal iφ
Axioms 4 and 5 for beliefs correspond together to the fol-
lowing semantic constraint (C.1) on models, Axiom D for
goals corresponds to the constraint (C.2) and, finally, the
axioms of positive and negative introspection for goals cor-
respond together to the semantic constraint (C.3).
(C.1) w ′ ∈ Bi(w) implies Bi(w) = Bi(w ′)
(C.2) Gi(w) 6= ∅
(C.3) w ′ ∈ Bi(w) implies Gi(w) = Gi(w ′)
3. Adding announcements
We suppose that announcements are public, and that they
only modify the agents’ beliefs, but not their goals. Tech-
nically, our logic combines Kooi’s version of public an-
nouncement logic (Kooi 2007) with Gerbrandy’s logic of
private updates (Gerbrandy 1999; Gerbrandy and Groen-
eveld 1997). The latter allows us to update beliefs without
updating goals, and is a particular dynamic epistemic logic
(Baltag, Moss, and Solecki 1998; Baltag and Moss 2004;
van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek, and Kooi 2007).1
We extend our language by modal operators of public an-
nouncement by adding [φ!]φ to the above BNF. The formula
[ψ!]φ reads “φ holds after the public announcement of ψ”.
In order to give semantics to announcements we de-
fine the update of a model by an announcement. The up-
date of M = 〈W,B,G, V 〉 by φ! is the model Mφ! =
〈Wφ!,Bφ!,Gφ!, V φ!〉 where
• Wφ! = {ub : u ∈W} ∪ {ug : u ∈W};
• Bφ! = {〈ub, vb〉 : 〈u, v〉 ∈ B and M, v |= φ}∪{〈ug, vg〉 :
〈u, v〉 ∈ B};
• Gφ! = {〈ub, vg〉 : 〈u, v〉 ∈ G} ∪ {〈ug, vg〉 : 〈u, v〉 ∈ G};
• V φ!(ub) = V φ!(ug) = V (u).
Basically, the effect of an announcement is to shrink the set
of belief accessible worlds, while keeping constant the set of
goal accessible worlds.
Proposition 1. For every φ, if M is a model of our logic of
beliefs and goals then Mφ! is still a model of our logic of
beliefs and goals.
Proof. The proof consists in verifying the conservation of
semantic properties seen ahead.
• For C.1: There are two cases for belief after announce-
ment: either w2b ∈ Bψ!i (w1b) or w2g ∈ Bψ!i (w1g). In each
case, it implies by definition that w2 ∈ Bi(w1). Then
Bi(w1) = Bi(w2), because M satisfies constraint C.1.
And also assume w3 ∈ Bi(w2). Then w3 ∈ Bi(w1).
1For readers who are familiar with these logics: our event mod-
els have two possible events b and g, where Bi = {〈b, b〉, 〈g, g〉}
and Gi = {〈b, g〉, 〈g, g〉}.
In case w2b ∈ Bψ!i (w1b): if w3 |= ψ then w3b ∈
Bψ!i (w2b) and w3b ∈ Bψ!i (w1b). And if w3b 6|= ψ
then w3b 6∈ Bψ!i (w2b) and w3b 6∈ Bψ!i (w1b) and w3g 6∈
Bψ!i (w2b) and w3g 6∈ Bψ!i (w1b).
Then Bψ!i (w1b) = Bψ!i (w2b).
In case w2g ∈ Bψ!i (w1g): whether or not w3 |= ψ then
w3g ∈ Bψ!i (w2g) and w3g ∈ Bψ!i (w1g).
Then Bψ!i (w1g) = Bψ!i (w2g).
Therefore, M ψ! satisfies constraint C.1.
• For C.2: Let us suppose Gψ!i (wb) = ∅ . Then Gi(w) = ∅
by the semantic definition, and it is contradictory with the
constraints on M . Then Gψ!i (wb) 6= ∅. It is the same proof
for Gψ!i (wg) 6= ∅. Therefore M ψ! satisfies constraint C.2.
• For C.3: There are two cases for belief after announce-
ment: either w2b ∈ Bψ!i (w1b) or w2g ∈ Bψ!i (w1g). In each
case, it implies by definition that w2 ∈ Bi(w1). Then
Gi(w1) = Gi(w2), because M satisfies constraint C.3.
And also assume w3 ∈ Gi(w2). Then w3 ∈ Gi(w1).
In case w2b ∈ Bψ!i (w1b) : w3g ∈ Gψ!i (w2b) and w3g ∈
Gψ!i (w1b). And in case w2g ∈ Bψ!i (w1g) : w3g ∈ Gψ!i (w2g)
and w3g ∈ Gψ!i (w1g).
Then Gψ!i (w1) = Gψ!i (w2) in both cases.
Therefore, M ψ! satisfies constraint C.3.
Items 1, 2 and 3 together imply that M ψ! is a model of our
logic of belief and goal.
The truth condition for announcement is:
• M,u |= [ψ!]φ iff Mψ!, ub |= φ
We suppose the usual definitions of validity and satisfia-
bility. Then the following equivalences are valid:
(3) [ψ!]p↔ p if p ∈ PRP
(4) [ψ!]¬φ↔ ¬[ψ!]φ
(5) [ψ!](φ ∧ χ)↔ ([ψ!]φ ∧ [ψ!]χ)
(6) [ψ!]Bel iφ↔ Bel i(ψ → [ψ!]φ)
(7) [ψ!]Goal iφ↔ Goal iφ
Proof.
(3) 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w |= [ψ!]p
iff 〈Wψ!,Bψ!,Gψ!, V ψ!〉,wb |= p
iff w ∈ V ψ!(p)
iff w ∈ V (p)
iff 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w |= p.
(4) 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w |= [ψ!]¬ϕ
iff 〈Wψ!,Bψ!,Gψ!, V ψ!〉,wb |= ¬ϕ
iff 〈Wψ!,Bψ!,Gψ!, V ψ!〉,wb 6|= ϕ
iff 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w 6|= [ψ!]ϕ
iff 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w |= ¬[ψ!]ϕ.
(5) 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w |= [ψ!](ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
iff 〈Wψ!,Bψ!,Gψ!, V ψ!〉,wb |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
iff 〈Wψ!,Bψ!,Gψ!, V ψ!〉,wb |= ϕ1
and 〈Wψ!,Bψ!,Gψ!, V ψ!〉,wb |= ϕ2
iff 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w |= [ψ!]ϕ1 and 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w |= [ψ!]ϕ2
iff 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w |= [ψ!]ϕ1 ∧ [ψ!]ϕ2.
(6) We show that the equivalent formula
¬[ψ!]Bel iϕ↔ ¬Bel i(ψ → [ψ!]ϕ)
is valid:
〈W,B,G, V 〉,w |= ¬[ψ!]Bel iϕ
iff 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w |= [ψ!]¬Bel iϕ, by (4),
iff 〈Wψ!,Bψ!,Gψ!, V ψ!〉,wb |= ¬Bel iϕ
iff ∃w ′b ∈ Bψ!(wb) s.t. 〈Wψ!,Bψ!,Gψ!, V ψ!〉,w ′b |= ¬ϕ
iff ∃w ′ ∈ B(w) s.t. 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w ′ |= ψ and
〈W,B,G, V 〉,w ′ |= [ψ!]¬ϕ
iff ∃w ′ ∈ B(w) s.t. 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w ′ |= ψ ∧¬[ψ!]ϕ , by (4),
iff ∃w ′ ∈ B(w) s.t. 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w ′ |= ¬(ψ → [ψ!]ϕ)
iff 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w |= ¬Bel i(ψ → [ψ!]ϕ).
(7) We show that the equivalent formula
¬[ψ!]Goal iϕ↔ ¬Goal iϕ
is valid:
〈W,B,G, V 〉,w |= ¬[ψ!]Goal iϕ
iff 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w |= [ψ!]¬Goal iϕ, by (4),
iff 〈Wψ!,Bψ!,Gψ!, V ψ!〉,wb |= ¬Goal iϕ
iff ∃w ′g ∈ Gψ!(wb) s.t. 〈Wψ!,Bψ!,Gψ!, V ψ!〉,w ′g |= ¬ϕ
iff ∃w ′ ∈ G(w) s.t. 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w ′ |= ¬ϕ
iff 〈W,B,G, V 〉,w |= ¬Goal iϕ.
The following rules of equivalence for announcements
(8) from φ↔ φ′ infer [ψ!]φ↔ [ψ!]φ′
(9) from ψ ↔ ψ′ infer [ψ!]φ↔ [ψ′!]φ
preserve validity.
The above equivalences 3-7 and rules of inference 8-9 are
so-called reduction axioms: they allow to ‘move’ announce-
ment operators across the other logical operators ‘inside’
formulas, and to eliminate them once they face a propo-
sitional letters. Rewriting formulas starting from the in-
nermost announcements, we can in this way eliminate an-
nouncement operators from formulas, resulting in an equiv-
alent formula of the underlying logic of beliefs and goals.
This provides a completeness result for our logic of an-
nouncements.
Theorem 1. Our logic of beliefs and goals is sound and
complete.
4. Speech acts as announcements
In dynamic epistemic logics announcements are usually
viewed as communication actions performed by an agent
that is ‘outside the system’, i.e. that is not part of the set
of agents AGT under consideration. Our aim is to investi-
gate how communication actions performed by agents from
AGT can be modelled in our logic of announcements. To
that end we consider a particular subset of announcements:
we say that formulas of the form Bel iψ! or Goal iψ! are
about the mental state of agent i. We identify announce-
ments about the mental state of i, with actions performed by
i. We follow Grice’s idea that speech acts are expressions of
intentions by the speaker, and consider that such expressions
take the form Goal iψ! of announcements of goals. Such an-
nouncements of goals are directed towards an addressee.
4.1 Assertive speech acts
We consider the basic assertive as the primitive speech act
and we suppose that the other kinds of speech acts are de-
fined from this primitive speech act. We identify the ex-
pression “i asserts to j that ψ” with the announcement of
Goal iBel jψ:
Assert i,jψ
def= Goal iBel jψ!
One might express a more complex notion of as-
sertive speech act whose content is communicative in-
tention in the sense of Grice (Grice 1989) of the form
Goal iBel jGoal iBel jψ, i.e. agent i wants that j believes
that i wants that j believes ψ. In the classical Gricean view
of linguistic communication, a communicative intention of
the speaker is aimed at the recognition by the hearer of the
speaker’s goal of making the hearer to believe something.
Starting from the basic assertive, we define the two speech
acts inform and confirm. The speech act inform is a speech
act assert under the precondition that i believes that j has no
opinion about ψ. We identify it therefore with the announce-
ment of Bel i(¬Bel jψ ∧ ¬Bel j¬ψ) ∧Goal iBel jψ:
Informi,jψ
def= Bel i(¬Bel jψ ∧¬Bel j¬ψ)∧Goal iBel jψ!
The speech act confirm is a speech act assert under the
precondition that i believes that j believes ψ. We iden-
tify it therefore with the announcement of Bel iBel jψ ∧
Goal iBel jψ:
Confirmi,jψ
def= Bel iBel jψ ∧Goal iBel jψ!
In both cases one might add the sincerity condition of as-
sertives to the announcement: the speaker believes what he
asserts. We then would write Bel iψ∧Goal iBel jψ instead of
Goal iBel jψ for the basic assertive of the form Assert i,jϕ,
etc.
4.2 Directive speech acts
The speech act request is the basic speech act of the directive
kind. We define it from the assertive. We identify “i requests
j that ψ” with “i asserts that he wants that j has the goal that
ψ”:
Request i,jψ
def= Assert i,jGoal iGoal jψ
The yes-no query “i asks j whether ψ” is a particular case
of a request:
Ask i,jψ
def= Request i,j(Bel iψ ∨ Bel i¬ψ)
Note that if we had the sincerity condition Bel iψ for the
assertive speech act, under the condition ¬Bel i⊥, the act
of request would imply Goal iGoal jψ and the yes-no query
would imply Goal iGoal j(Bel iψ ∨ Bel i¬ψ).
Suppose j is cooperative. This could be expressed by the
formula
Bel jGoal iBel jGoal iGoal jp→ Goal jp
Under this hypothesis the satisfaction conditions can be
guaranteed, i.e. we have
Theorem 2.
` [Request i,jp](Bel jGoal iBel jGoal iGoal jp
→ Goal jp)→ [Request i,jp]Goal jp
Proof. We have the theorems that
` [Request i,jp]Bel jGoal iBel jGoal iGoal jp
and ` [Request i,jp]Goal jp↔ Goal jp
so by K `[Request i,jp](Bel jGoal iBel jGoal iGoal jp
→ Goal jp)→ [Request i,jp]Goal jp
4.3 Moore sentences in speech acts
In our logic one can study Moore-like sentences for beliefs.
We can prove that the assertion of p ∧ ¬Bel ip leads to
inconsistencies of the (higher-order) beliefs:
Theorem 3.
` Bel i(p ∧ ¬Bel ip)↔ Bel i⊥
` [Assert i,jBel i(p ∧ ¬Bel ip)!]Bel jGoal iBel jBel i⊥
Proof.
• ` ¬Bel ip→ Bel i¬Bel ip (axiom 5)
so ` ¬Bel i¬Bel ip→ Bel ip
and ` Bel iBel ip ∧ ¬Bel i⊥ → ¬Bel i¬Bel ip
so ` Bel iBel ip ∧ ¬Bel i⊥ → Bel ip
and so ` Bel iBel ip ∧ ¬Bel i⊥ ↔ Bel ip ∧ ¬Bel i⊥
Bel i(p ∧ ¬Bel ip)
↔ Bel ip ∧ Bel i¬Bel ip ∧ (Bel i⊥ ∨ ¬Bel i⊥)
↔ (Bel ip∧Bel i¬Bel ip∧Bel i⊥)∨(Bel ip∧Bel i¬Bel ip∧
¬Bel i⊥)
↔ Bel i(p ∧ ¬Bel ip ∧ ⊥) ∨ (Bel iBel ip ∧ ¬Bel i⊥ ∧
Bel i¬Bel ip)
↔ Bel i⊥
Therefore ` Bel i(p ∧ ¬Bel ip)↔ Bel i⊥
• So [Assert i,jBel i(p ∧ ¬Bel ip)!]Bel jGoal iBel jBel i⊥
iff Bel j(Goal iBel jBel i(p ∧ ¬Bel ip)→
[Goal iBel jBel i(p ∧ ¬Bel ip)!]Goal iBel jBel i⊥) by (6)
iff Bel j(Goal iBel jBel i(p ∧ ¬Bel ip)→
Goal iBel jBel i⊥) by (7)
iff Bel j(Goal iBel jBel i⊥ → Goal iBel jBel i⊥)
iff Bel j>
which is a tautology.
Therefore
` [Assert i,jBel i(p ∧ ¬Bel ip)!]Bel jGoal iBel jBel i⊥
On the same way, we can prove that
` [Assert i,jBel i(p ∧ ¬Bel ip)!]Bel iGoal iBel jBel i⊥
5. Discussion and conclusion
An immediate extension of our logic is to add announce-
ments modifying goals, similar to (van Benthem 2007;
Roy 2008; van Benthem, Girard, and Roy to appear). Such
announcements would leave an agent’s beliefs unaltered. In
order to model this form of goal change, a product construc-
tion symmetric to the one for beliefs can be used.
Another issue we intend to investigate in the future is the
theory of speech acts in the context of indirected commu-
nication. The idea is to extend the analysis presented in
this paper to the case in which agents make assertions, re-
quests, queries, etc. to other agents by using a shared black-
board which can be observed by other agents connected to
it. In this case, an agent’s speech act (defined in terms of an-
nouncements) modify and update the contents of the black-
board which is accessible to other agents, rather than directly
modifying the beliefs and goals of other agents. In order to
model this notion of blackboard, as a form of artefact used
for mediating communication between agents, we intend to
use the logic of acceptance recently proposed in (Lorini et
al. 2009).
We also leave open the problem of integrating belief revi-
sion mechanisms into our logic, and refer to (Aucher 2003;
2008; van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek, and Kooi 2007; Baltag
and Smets 2007) for possible solutions.
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